

## **DECLARATION OF BRIAN FONSECA**

I, Brian Fonseca, declare the following:

### ***Qualifications to Give Specific Opinion on this Case***

1. I am an expert in the areas of U.S. national security, geopolitics, and American foreign policy. I have published extensively on Russia and have testified before the U.S. Congress's House Foreign Affairs Committee on Russian foreign policy in Venezuela. I have spent the last twenty years engaged in security studies, including field research in Asia (East Asia and South Asia), the Middle East, North Africa, and Latin America.

2. I am currently employed at Florida International University (FIU), where I lead the university's national security studies and intelligence studies program. I serve as the director of the Institute for Public Policy at FIU's Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs. I serve as an adjunct professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations where I teach graduate and undergraduate courses in national security and cyber warfare, among others. FIU designates me as an expert on security.<sup>1</sup>

3. I served in the United States Marine Corps from 1997-2004 and facilitated the training of foreign military forces in both hostile theaters and during peacetime operations. I encountered the Russian military while deployed to Kosovo in spring of 2000 as part of the UN peacekeeping force KFOR. I was deployed to North Africa to work with Egyptian officials in October 2001 in support of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and North Africa. I was deployed to the Middle East from March to July 2003 as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

4. From 2007-2011, I led a U.S. Department of Defense security analysis program based at FIU. In that program, I led two seminal studies on Islam and Latin America. The first, *Muslim*

---

<sup>1</sup> See FIU NEWS, <https://news.fiu.edu/2017/07/venezuela-experts/112976>

*Identities in Latin America*, focused on understanding the history and composition of Muslim communities throughout Latin America. The second study, *Middle East—Latin American Relations*, examined the economic, security, cultural, and political ties between the various Middle Eastern and Latin American countries. In 2008, I led a groundbreaking study on Iran-Latin America relations for the U.S. Department of Defense.

5. In 2009, I authored a study titled: *Human Smuggling and the Terrorist-Criminal Nexus*. In that study, I developed a new analytic framework to study the convergence or nexus of terrorist and criminal organizations. The framework assessed four dominant areas of convergence: network organizational structures, fusing of illicit activities (including threat finance), use of corruption nodes to facilitate operations, and the proliferation of alternatively governed spaces.

6. I left Florida International University for two years to serve fulltime in the U.S. intelligence community from 2011-2013 in support of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) enterprise. During that period, I authored numerous classified products on a wide range of security themes, including Russian engagement in Latin America. I returned to FIU in 2013 to assume a leadership position at the Applied Research Center.

7. Since 2010, I have taught courses on politics and international relations, with elements focusing on transnational organized crime, cyber warfare, and U.S. national security. Since returning to FIU in 2013, I have served as a subject matter expert supporting United States Southern Command and routinely provide expert analysis on Russia, China, Iran, and Latin America.

8. Since 2016, I have published several articles and/or reports focusing on Russia. I co-authored a book titled: *The New US Security Agenda: Trends and Emerging Threats*, published by Palgrave Macmillan. The book includes chapters on countering violent extremism and terrorism

as well as the emerging threat that Russia poses to American national security.<sup>2</sup> I co-authored a publication in Military Review with Russian scholar Vladimir Rouvinski titled: *The Russians of Latin America: Moscow's Bid for Influence Over Russian-Speaking Communities in the Region*.<sup>3</sup> I published an article with David Kramer titled: "A Strategic Alliance in the Making: Should the U.S. be worried about a Sino-Russian alliance emerging?" in The American Interest.<sup>4</sup> I published an article in Foreign Policy Magazine titled: "The Perils of a Putsch in Venezuela: Encouraging a coup in Caracas will give Russia and China a foothold in the United States' backyard."<sup>5</sup> I published an article in Dialogo, a U.S. Department of Defense publication, titled "Russian Deceptive Propaganda Growing Fast in Latin America."<sup>6</sup> I published an editorial with CNN titled: "Venezuela Isn't Syria: Why the US shouldn't overreact to Putin's Bluff."<sup>7</sup> Finally, I published a

---

<sup>2</sup> See BRIAN FONSECA & JONATHAN D. ROSEN, *The New US Security Agenda* (2017), <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-50194-9#toc>.

<sup>3</sup> See Brian Fonseca & Vladimir Rouvinski, *The Russians of Latin America: Moscow's Bid for Influence over Russian-Speaking Communities in the Region*, ARMY UNIVERSITY PRESS, <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/November-December-2018/Fonseca-Russia-Latam/#:~:text=Russian%20migrants%20first%20appeared%20in%20Latin%20America%20and,the%20Baltic%20provinces%20in%20Poland%20and%20western%20Ukraine>.

<sup>4</sup> See Brian Fonseca & David Kramer, *A Strategic Alliance in the Making?*, THE AMERICAN INTEREST, <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/09/11/a-strategic-alliance-in-the-making/>.

<sup>5</sup> See Brian Fonseca, *The Perils of a Putsch in Venezuela*, FOREIGN POLICY, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/04/the-perils-of-a-putsch-in-venezuela/>.

<sup>6</sup> See Brian Fonseca, *Russian Deceptive Propaganda Growing Fast in Latin America*, DIALOGO, <https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/russian-deceptive-propaganda-growing-fast-in-latin-america/#.Yx6Nh6TMKUk>.

<sup>7</sup> Brian Fonseca, David J. Kramer & Frank O. Mara, *Venezuela isn't Syria: Why the U.S. shouldn't overreact to Putin's bluff*, CNN, <https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/01/opinions/venezuela-isnt-syria-and-putin-is-bluffing-fonseca-kramer-mora/index.html>

report with the D.C.-based think tank New America titled: “Are China and Russia on the Cyber Offensive in Latin America and the Caribbean?”<sup>8</sup>

9. Additional publications include “A Mutating Virus: How Organized Crime Groups Are Evolving, and What Governments Can Do About It” (Americas Quarterly, 2021), “It’s Not the 1970s Again for Latin America’s Militaries. Here’s Why” (Americas Quarterly, 2020), “Two Nations, One Revolution: The Evolution of Contemporary Cuba-Venezuela Relations” (Wilson Center, 2020).

10. I routinely provide analytical support to the Departments of Defense and State. I frequently appear on BBC World News, CNN, Univision, CBS, and I have been cited by the Washington Post, Bloomberg, NBC, and various other national and international media outlets. I also speak regularly at conferences about American national security and foreign policy.

11. On March 3, 2021, I testified before the United States Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee about the Russian-Venezuelan relationship.<sup>9</sup> This was the second time I testified before the U.S. Congress; the first was in 2019.

12. In preparing this affidavit, I have relied on my professional experience and knowledge, conducted additional research, interviewed sources, and read associated court documents.

---

<sup>8</sup> Robert Morgus, Brian Fonseca & Kieran Green, *Are China and Russia on the Cyber Offensive in Latin America and the Caribbean*, NEW AMERICA, <https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/reports/russia-china-cyber-offensive-latam-caribbean/>

<sup>9</sup> HOUSE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, *A Way Forward for Venezuela: The Humanitarian, Diplomatic, and National Security Challenges Facing the Biden Administration*, available at: <https://www.congress.gov/event/117th-congress/house-event/LC67768/text?s=1&r=60>

### ***A Brief History: Russian-Taliban Relations***

13. Moscow has its own history of a failed military mission in Afghanistan. In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to prop up a Communist government. The Soviet military mission failed in 1989 after facing violent resistance from the locals, ultimately leading to their withdrawal.

14. During the first decade of the U.S. war in Afghanistan, Russia and the U.S. were aligned due to shared interests in counterterrorism and counter-narcotics. However, my research indicates that their alignment began to disappear in the 2000s as tensions grew over Syria and Russian claims to Georgia, Crimea, and Ukraine.<sup>10</sup>

15. As the U.S. imposed sanctions on Russia, the latter saw the former's presence in the Middle East and Central Asia as a threat, giving rise to Russia's campaign to weaken the U.S. and advance its own influence and power around the globe.

16. Russia, with Vladimir Putin reassuming the presidency and taking a confrontational posture towards the West, began to establish diplomatic channels with the Taliban to develop a mutually beneficial alliance. This alliance allowed Russia to reassert its influence in the region, complicate the U.S.-Taliban relationship, counter American advantages abroad, and interfere in American politics.

### ***The Russian Government Provided Direct Support to the Taliban Insurgency***

17. According to my research, despite a history of tension between Moscow and the Taliban, Russian President Vladimir Putin and key Taliban leaders formed an alliance against the U.S. In fact, the Russian government has coordinated with and provided material support to Taliban

---

<sup>10</sup> See *Russia Supports the Taliban*, WARSAW INSTITUTE, <https://warsawinstitute.org/russia-supports-taliban/>; see also *How Russia Built a Channel to the Taliban, Once an Enemy*, NEW YORK TIMES, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/13/world/asia/russia-taliban-afghanistan.html>.

insurgents in Afghanistan since at least 2007 to counter U.S. influence in places such as Afghanistan, Syria, and Eastern Europe.

18. U.S. intelligence claims that Russia's material support to the Taliban started sometime between 2012 and 2015, which included material support to Taliban insurgents locked in fighting Afghani and American troops. For instance, Moscow supplied weapons to the Taliban during campaigns to capture the city of Kunduz in northern Afghanistan in 2015.<sup>11</sup>

19. In 2015, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova confirmed that Moscow provided Taliban insurgents with intelligence to support their fight against ISIS.<sup>12</sup> Russian officials also made public statements about providing support to the Taliban in their fight against violent non-state actors in Syria who were attempting to overthrow the Russian-backed Assad government.<sup>13</sup>

20. Starting in 2017, U.S. Pentagon officials expressed concerns about Russia providing weapons, financial support, and intelligence to the Taliban, leading to Congressional hearings that shed light on the matter.

21. In February 2017, General John Nicholson, Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan, stated, "Russia has become more assertive over the past year, overtly lending legitimacy to the Taliban to undermine NATO efforts and bolster belligerents using the false narrative that only the Taliban

---

<sup>11</sup> See *US intelligence suspects Russia of supporting the Taliban*, UAWIRE, <https://uawire.org/news/us-intelligence-suspects-russia-of-supporting-the-taliban>.

<sup>12</sup> See Brian Todd & Steve Almasy, *Russia, Taliban share intelligence in fight against ISIS*, CNN, <https://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/24/europe/putin-taliban-isis/>.

<sup>13</sup> *Id.*

are fighting ISIS-K.” General Nicholson’s remarks were made during testimony before the U.S. Congress’ Senate Armed Services Committee at a hearing on Afghanistan.<sup>14</sup>

22. In a separate 2020 congressional hearing, then retired General Nicholson stated on the record, “in the case of the Russian army and funding that went to the Taliban in 2018, one of the ways that we acted on this was to go public. And I did an interview with the British Broadcasting Company<sup>15</sup> in which we talked about what the Russians were doing, the fact that Governors of northern provinces had brought me weapons and said, ‘[t]hese came from Russia,’ they were given by the Russians to the Taliban.”<sup>16</sup> In that same BBC interview, General Nicholson said that Russia exaggerated the number of ISIS fighters in Afghanistan to legitimize Moscow’s material support to the Taliban. General Nicholson further elaborated on how the Russian assistance to the Taliban helped inflict higher casualties against units that had U.S. advisors. *Id.*

23. The 2020 hearings were in response to media reporting that Russian intelligence was offering bounties to Taliban insurgents in exchange for killing American servicemembers. The allegations were never fully corroborated by the U.S. intelligence community but several prominent media outlets—Washington Post, Associated Press, and New York Times—claimed that there was evidence that the Russian G.R.U. unit was targeting Americans through bounties. Furthermore, Congressman Brad Sherman, senior member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, has noted: “Russia attacks Georgia, the Ukraine, interferes in Syria, interferes in elections in the United

---

<sup>14</sup> General John W. Nicholson, *Statement For the Record by General John W. Nicholson Commander U.S. Forces – Afghanistan Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Situation In Afghanistan*, [https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Nicholson\\_02-09-17.pdf](https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Nicholson_02-09-17.pdf)

<sup>15</sup> See Justin Rowlett, *Russia ‘arming the Afghan Taliban’, says US*, BBC NEWS, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43500299>.

<sup>16</sup> HOUSE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, *Russian Bounties on U.S. Troops: Why Hasn’t the Administration Responded?*, available at <https://www.congress.gov/event/116th-congress/house-event/LC65573/text?s=1&r=2>



States, interferes in Montenegro, occupies eastern Ukraine and the Crimea, and according to Secretary Pompeo ... has been arming the Taliban for years. So, we have all those facts; plus, good reason to believe that they are providing bounty on our soldiers.” *Id.*

24. In April 2017, then Secretary of Defense James Mattis, speaking in Afghanistan, was asked to “address the influx of Russian weapons into Afghanistan ... and showing up in Taliban hands in Helmand, Kandahar and Urozgan”. In response, he acknowledged Moscow’s material support to the Taliban and stated, “we’re going to have to confront Russia where what they’re doing is contrary to international law...” and specifically referenced “weapons being funneled here”.<sup>17</sup>

25. In a committee hearing titled Military Assessment of the Security Challenges in the Greater Middle East, then Commander of U.S. Central Command General Joseph Votel testified that “it is fair to assume they [Russia] may be providing some kind of support to the [Taliban] in terms of weapons or other things that may be there.”<sup>18</sup> Similarly, General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, Commander for the U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander raised the issue of Russian material support to the Taliban before the Senate Armed Services Committee.<sup>19</sup>

26. While U.S. officials raised concerns about Russian material support to the Taliban, Afghan officials and Taliban insurgents themselves also openly confirmed that Moscow was supplying weapons to Taliban fighters throughout Afghanistan. Afghans claimed that Russia was supplying

---

<sup>17</sup> U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, *Press Conference by Secretary Mattis in Afghanistan*, available at <https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1161325/press-conference-by-secretary-mattis-in-afghanistan/>.

<sup>18</sup> COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES: HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, *Military Assessment of The Security Challenges in the Greater Middle East*, available at <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115hhrg25093/html/CHRG-115hhrg25093.htm>.

<sup>19</sup> See COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES: UNITED STATES SENATE, *Hearing to Receive Testimony on United States European Command*, available at [https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/17-24\\_03-23-17.pdf](https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/17-24_03-23-17.pdf)



hundreds of Kalashnikov rifles, machine guns, and grenades.<sup>20</sup> Abdul Jabar Qahraman, the top official charged with overseeing the Helmand Province; Gulbahar Mujahid, chief security commander of Farah Province; and Farah Province deputy governor, Muhammad Younis Rasooli, all corroborated that Russia was aiding the Taliban. According to these sources, Russia facilitated the creation of Taliban training camps in the Khorasan province of Iran, and equipping fighters with advanced weaponry. Afghani officials also assert that Iran had facilitated high-level dialogue between Taliban insurgents and Russian officials.<sup>21</sup>

27. Additionally, videos released in mid-2017 showed two different Taliban cells in north and west Afghanistan in possession of Russian weapons, which Taliban insurgents claimed were supplied to them by Russian government sources. Similarly, Taliban insurgents based in Herat stated that they received weapons freely across the Tajikistan border from Russia.<sup>22</sup>

28. Taliban officials have publicly acknowledged Russian government financial support to Taliban operations. In October 2017, several media outlets reported that Taliban representatives went on the record to substantiate that the Russian government was directly financing Taliban operations in Afghanistan. Taliban representatives confirmed that Russian intelligence aided in transporting oil into Afghanistan from Uzbekistan. Taliban representatives stated that the Taliban generated \$2.5 million per month in oil sales in Afghanistan.<sup>23</sup>

---

<sup>20</sup> See *Afghan Lawmakers: Russian Support to Taliban No Secret*, VOA NEWS, [https://www.voanews.com/a/extremism-watch\\_afghan-lawmakers-russian-support-taliban-no-secret/6192205.html](https://www.voanews.com/a/extremism-watch_afghan-lawmakers-russian-support-taliban-no-secret/6192205.html); see also *Russia accused of supplying Taliban as power shifts create strange bedfellows*, THE GUARDIAN, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/22/russia-supplying-taliban-afghanistan>.

<sup>21</sup> See Ahmad Majidiyar, *Iran allegedly facilitating Taliban-Russian contracts*, MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-allegedly-facilitating-taliban-russia-contacts>.

<sup>22</sup> See Nick Paton Walsh, *Videos suggest Russian government may be arming Taliban*, CNN, <https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/25/asia/taliban-weapons-afghanistan/index.html>.

<sup>23</sup> See *Russia funds Taliban in war against NATO forces*, THE TIMES, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/russia-funds-taliban-in-war-against-nato-forces-hvfl3cgrg>

### ***Russia – Taliban Relations Today***

29. Following the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan in August 2021, Russian President Vladimir Putin called on the international community to recognize the Taliban government.<sup>24</sup>

30. In April 2022, the Russian government formally established diplomatic relations with the Taliban. The handover of the Afghan embassy in Moscow to the Taliban was marked by the raising of the Taliban flag by its representatives.<sup>25</sup> Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said “[w]e are convinced that the international community should actively cooperate with Afghanistan’s new government, encouraging steps aimed at its official recognition by the UN and all its participants.”

#### **Taliban Flag at Afghanistan Embassy in Moscow**



Source: Voices of America, 2022

<sup>24</sup> See Ivan U Klyszcz, *Russia Defines Its Post-Takeover Role in the Afghan Conflict*, RUSI, <https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russia-defines-its-post-takeover-role-afghan-conflict>.

<sup>25</sup> See Christine Douglass-Williams, *Russia hands over Afghan embassy in Moscow to the Taliban, Islamic flag is raised*, JIHADWATCH, <https://www.jihadwatch.org/2022/04/russia-hands-over-afghan-embassy-in-moscow-to-the-taliban-islamic-flag-is-raised>; see also *Russia latest country to establish diplomatic ties with Taliban*, GLOBAL SECURITY, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2022/04/mil-220409-voa01.htm>.

31. The signing of a deal between Russia and the Taliban in September 2022 entailed the supply of one million tons of gasoline, one million tons of diesel fuel, five-hundred thousand tons of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), and two million tons of wheat to Afghanistan on an annual basis.

These negotiations occurred as Moscow sought alternative markets for its energy exports due to the broad sanctions imposed on Russia by the U.S. and Europe following the invasion of Ukraine.<sup>26</sup>

32. Nooruddin Azizi, who is currently serving as Afghanistan's acting Minister of Commerce and Industry, announced in February 2023 that the Taliban-led government is creating a consortium of businesses that includes Russian companies. In the interview with Reuters, Azizi stated that "shipments of oil, gas and wheat under a major deal with Russia last year had begun arriving in Afghanistan by road and rail through Central Asia...after the payments were made via banking channels despite sanctions that have limited many international payments. He did not elaborate on which banks had facilitated the payment."<sup>27</sup>

33. On April 13, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attended a conference in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, along with his Chinese, Iranian, and Pakistani counterparts, to pledge support to the Taliban government. According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, Lavrov and his counterparts discussed the importance of collaborating with Afghan authorities to maintain political stability

---

<sup>26</sup> See Yawar, M. & Greenfield, C, *Taliban officials nearing contract for purchase of gasoline from Russia*, REUTERS, <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/taliban-officials-nearing-contract-purchase-gasoline-russia-2022-08-29/>; see also *Taliban signs 'preliminary' deal with Russia for oil, gas, wheat*, ALJAZEERA, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/28/taliban-signs-preliminary-deal-with-russia-to-buy-gas-wheat>; Yawar, M. & Greenfield, *Afghan Taliban sign deal for Russian oil products, gas and wheat*, REUTERS, <https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/exclusive-afghan-taliban-sign-deal-russian-oil-products-gas-wheat-2022-09-27/#:~:text=Azizi%20said%20the%20deal%20would,million%20tonnes%20of%20wheat%20annually>.

<sup>27</sup> See *Taliban Sets Up Investment Consortium with Firms from Russia, Iran*, REUTERS, <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/taliban-sets-up-investment-consortium-with-firms-russia-iran-2023-02-22/>

and prevent a humanitarian crisis, as well as the coordination of efforts to counter the threats of terrorism and drug trafficking from Afghan territory.<sup>28</sup>

***VTB Bank of Europe is a Subsidiary of an Instrument of the Russian Government that Russia Uses to Fund Destabilizing Activities***

34. The banking system in Russia accounts for approximately 87% of the total assets in the financial sector. The banking sector in Russia is highly concentrated with the two largest banks, Sberbank and VTB Bank Public Joint Stock Company (hereafter “VTB Bank”), holding around 50% of the market.<sup>29</sup> Both, Sberbank and VTB Bank are majority state-owned.<sup>30</sup>

35. VTB Bank and its subsidiaries comprise the VTB Group. At the top of VTB Group’s structure is VTB Bank, the flagship company of the group. VTB Bank has an extensive network of offices across Russia and a presence in more than 20 countries worldwide. As a result, VTB Bank plays a significant role in the development of the Russian economy.

36. Below VTB Bank are several subsidiaries and affiliated companies that operate in different areas of the financial sector and have a significant presence outside of Russia.

37. In early 2018, VTB Bank consolidated its European divisions in Germany, Austria, and France into a single banking license based in Frankfurt am Main under VTB Bank (Europe) SE.<sup>31</sup> VTB Bank (Europe) SE is majority owned by VTB Bank and serves as VTB Bank’s presence in

---

<sup>28</sup> See *Russia, China FM attend high-level conference on Afghanistan*, ASSOCIATED PRESS, <https://apnews.com/article/russia-china-afghanistan-conference-uzbekistan-iran-pakistan-d234cb3547dd95d8832cd43ecc952b92>

<sup>29</sup> *Overview of the Financial Sector in Russia*, BLACK SEA TRADE & DEVELOPMENT BANK, [https://www.bstadb.org/Overview\\_of\\_the\\_fin\\_sector\\_RUSSIA.pdf](https://www.bstadb.org/Overview_of_the_fin_sector_RUSSIA.pdf)

<sup>30</sup> See *FACTBOX-Key Facts About Sanctioned Russian Bank VTB*, REUTERS, <https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-bank-vtb/factbox-key-facts-about-sanctioned-russian-bank-vtb-idUSL1N2UZ3MI>

<sup>31</sup> See *German regulator not planning to sell VTB’s subsidiary in Europe, to focus on protecting operating activities*, INTERFAX, <https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/83105/>



Europe. As a subsidiary of VTB Bank, VTB Bank (Europe) SE plays an important role in VTB Bank's overall strategy of expanding Russia's reach across the globe and benefits the parent company by increasing its revenue. VTB Bank (Europe) SE provides VTB Bank with access to key European markets, particularly in Germany and Austria, yielding higher income for Russia.

38. Sanctioned Russian banker, Andrey (Andrei) Kostin is the CEO of VTB Bank. My research indicates that Kostin has been a strong ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin since the early 1990s. After Putin became President of Russia in 2000, Kostin was appointed as the CEO of VTB Bank in 2002. Kostin has faced criticism for his close ties to the Kremlin, as well as for allegations of corruption and money laundering at VTB Bank.

39. According to my research, Moscow leverages VTB Bank and its subsidiaries, such as VTB Bank Europe, to promote Russia's foreign-policy goals and fund destabilizing activities around the world. VTB Bank functions as an unofficial source of funding for financing various global projects of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project has referred to VTB Bank as Vladimir Putin's "piggy bank."<sup>32</sup>

40. VTB Bank actively works abroad, through its subsidiaries, transferring non-transparent Russian business practices to other countries. For instance, in 2011 VTB Bank purchased Bulgartabac, a Bulgarian tobacco holding company, as part of an influence campaign designed to afford Moscow the ability to manipulate Bulgarian politics in destabilizing ways. The purchase was politically sensitive due to the tobacco industry's significance to the livelihood of ethnic Turks and Muslims, the core electorate of the Bulgarian political party Movement for Rights and Freedoms. Similarly, VTB Bank was involved in another suspicious investment scheme in

---

<sup>32</sup>See Armendariz, A, *et al.*, *Unchecked By Global Banks, Dirty Cash Destroys Dreams and Lives*, ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUPTION REPORTING PROJECT, <https://www.occrp.org/en/the-fincen-files/unchecked-by-global-banks-dirty-cash-destroys-dreams-and-lives>

Bulgaria: the purchase of Bulgarian Telecommunication Company, the largest telecommunication company in the country, in partnership with Corpbank, a political slush fund with connections to most political parties. My research indicates that VTB Bank's strategic acquisitions provided Moscow with critical influence over financial stability in Bulgaria.<sup>33</sup>

41. In 2016, Russia used VTB Bank to conduct influence operations during the U.S. elections. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network files, some which were gathered as part of U.S. Congressional committee investigations into Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, contain more than 1,500 suspicious activity reports related to VTB Bank.<sup>34</sup> Additionally, VTB Bank failed to register political influencers per the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).<sup>35</sup>

42. Additionally, there are several lawsuits alleging corruption and influence peddling by VTB Group,<sup>36</sup> and in at least one instance, a lawsuit alleging terrorism financing by VTB Bank.<sup>37</sup> For instance, in 2021, the SEC determined that VTB Capital, the VTB Group entity that comprises the VTB Group's investment banking business, breached anti-fraud provisions of federal securities

---

<sup>33</sup> See Dr. Dimitar Bechev, *Russia's Influence in Bulgaria*, New Direction: THE FOUNDATION FOR EUROPEAN REFORM, [http://eupolicy.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/ND-report-RussiasInfluenceInBulgaria-preview-lo-res\\_FV.pdf](http://eupolicy.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/ND-report-RussiasInfluenceInBulgaria-preview-lo-res_FV.pdf); see also Martin Vladimirov & Ruslan Stefanov, *THE RUSSIAN ECONOMIC GRIP ON CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE Chapter in Bulgaria: State Capture Unplugged*, (Routledge, 1st ed. 2018).

<sup>34</sup> See *supra* note 32.

<sup>35</sup> Carrie Levine, *How a sanctioned Russian bank wooed Washington*, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, <https://publicintegrity.org/politics/how-a-sanctioned-russian-bank-wooed-washington/>

<sup>36</sup> Rudnitsky, J, *et al.*, *Russia's VTB Bribe Claim May Set Back Kremlin Bank's Africa Ambitions*, THE MOSCOW TIMES, <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/11/08/russias-vtb-bribe-claim-kremlin-bank-africa-ambitions-a68100>; US Securities and Exchange Commission, Credit Suisse to Pay Nearly \$475 Million to U.S. and U.K. Authorities to Resolve Charges in Connection with Mozambican Bond Offerings, 2021, <https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-213>

<sup>37</sup> *Schansman, et al. v. VTB Bank PJSC, et al.*, 19-cv-02985-ALC (S.D.N.Y.).

laws. Shortly thereafter, the VTB Capital CEO tainted by this scandal left his position with VTB Capital to serve as CEO and Chairman of the Management Board at VTB Bank (Europe) SE.

43. The U.S. Treasury Department has imposed sanctions on VTB Bank and various subsidiaries several times over the years.

44. In the run-up to Russia's invasion of Crimea in 2014, VTB Bank dedicated an entire floor at its Imperia Tower headquarters in central Moscow to financing the country's war machine.<sup>38</sup> In fact, VTB Bank routed U.S. Dollars to or on behalf of the Donetsk People's Republic to carry out violent attacks intended to intimidate or coerce civilians and influence the Ukrainian government and other governments seeking to contain Russian aggression. As a result, in July 2014, the U.S. Department of Treasury and the E.U. sanctioned VTB Bank in response to Russia's annexation of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula.<sup>39</sup> Similarly, in August 2014, VTB Bank was added to the Canadian sanctions list due to its role in the Russo-Ukrainian War and the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17. In 2018, VTB Bank and its Chairman Andrei Kostin were sanctioned by the U.S. and E.U.

45. On February 24, 2022, the U.S. Office of Foreign Asset Control ("OFAC") imposed full blocking sanctions on VTB Bank and its subsidiaries, including but not limited to VTB Bank (Europe) SE, pursuant to E.O. 14024 to target the core infrastructure of Russia's financial system.<sup>40</sup>

---

<sup>38</sup> See Owen Walker, *Russia's bank turns from global ambitions to survival*, FINANCIAL TIMES, <https://www.ft.com/content/d8ceae9-aac4-42b7-b698-c3bf2a616f36>

<sup>39</sup> See US Treasury Press Release: *Treasury Sanctions Russia-based Bank Attempting to Circumvent U.S. Sanctions on Venezuela*, US DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm622#:~:text=Gazprombank%20was%20added%20to%20OFAC%E2%80%99s%20Sectoral%20Sanctions%20Identifications,to%20the%20SSI%20List%20on%20July%2029%2C%202014.>

<sup>40</sup> See US Treasury Press Release: *U.S. Treasury Announces Unprecedented & Expansive Sanctions Against Russia, Imposing Swift and Severe Economic Costs*, US DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0608>



VTB Bank and VTB Bank (Europe) SE were blocked for being owned and controlled by Russia, as well as for acting on behalf, directly or indirectly of Russia.

46. Despite these sanctions, on December 19, 2022, VTB Bank announced it had established direct banking arrangements with Iran, announcing it has launched a new service of cross-border transfers in Iranian rials, allowing individuals and businesses to transfer money to and from Russian and Iran, in direct contravention of U.S. Sanctions.<sup>41</sup> VTB Bank has become the first lender to provide banking services to Iran, a country that has been under its own international sanctions for decades.

47. On March 24, 2023, a resolution was passed for the liquidation of VTB Bank Europe commencing on April 1, 2023.<sup>42</sup>

### ***Conclusion***

48. It is my professional opinion that the Russian government has deep institutional ties with the Taliban and has provided material support to Taliban insurgents to carry out terrorist attacks on American citizens.

49. Russia's use of its illicit financial network to fund destabilizing activities is pervasive and coordinated across its vast financial network. To finance destabilizing activities around the globe, the Kremlin uses financial institutions like VTB Bank and its subsidiaries, including but not limited to VTB Bank (Europe) SE, to raise money and transfer money to and on behalf of terrorist organizations like the Taliban, among others.


---

<sup>41</sup> See Russia, Iran, Establish Direct Banking Arrangements Without SWIFT, RUSSIA BRIEFING, <https://www.russia-briefing.com/news/russia-iran-establish-direct-banking-arrangements-without-swift.html/>

<sup>42</sup> See the VTB Europe website: <https://www.vtb.eu/en/news-blog/news/resolution-liquidation-vtb-bank-europe-se/>

50. As such, I conclude that Russia uses its illicit financial network, which VTB Bank (Europe) SE is part of, to provide material support to the Taliban, and the Taliban in turn relies on this material support to carry out terrorist attacks.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on April 25, 2023.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Brian Fonseca', is written over a horizontal line.

Brian Fonseca

Brian Patrick Fonseca

Florida International University | 11200 SW 8<sup>th</sup> Street, LC 220, Miami, FL 33199  
Tel: (305) 348-7420 | Email: [Fonsecab@fiu.edu](mailto:Fonsecab@fiu.edu)

## CURRICULUM VITAE

### BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Brian Fonseca is Director of the Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy at Florida International University's (FIU) Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs where oversees research and educational programming in the areas of Latin America and Caribbean security and governance and U.S. national security. He serves as an Adjunct Professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations teaching courses on the Politics of Latin America and International Relations of Latin America, and he is a Cybersecurity Policy Fellow at the D.C.-based think tank New America. His analysis has been featured in national and international media. Recent publications include two edited volumes titled *Culture and National Security in the Americas* (Lexington Books, 2017) with Eduardo A. Gamarra and *Democracy and Security in Latin America* (Routledge, forthcoming 2021) with Orlando Perez and Gabriel Marcella, and he is co-author of *The New US Security Agenda: Trends and Emerging Threats* (Palgrave, 2017) with Jonathan Rosen. Brian holds degrees in International Business and International Relations from Florida International University in Miami, Florida, and he has attended Sichuan University in Chengdu, China, and National Defense University in Washington D.C. From 1997 to 2004, he served in the United States Marine Corps and facilitated the training of foreign military forces in both hostile theaters and during peacetime operations.

### PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

---

#### **Florida International University**

*Director of the Jack Gordon Institute for Public Policy*

**November 2015—Present**

- Lead the university's public policy institute, including academic, research, and professional education programming.
- Led 700% growth during first 4-year appointment as director.
- Serve as Principal Investigator for more than \$6M in federal funding.
- Serve as a subject matter expert in the areas of U.S. national security, American foreign policy, and cybersecurity policy.

*Executive Director of Cybersecurity@FIU*

**January 2019—Present**

- Serve as the university lead for the emerging preeminent program Cybersecurity@FIU.
- Lead the development and implementation of university-wide strategy in growing cybersecurity programming at FIU.
- Led the development of cybersecurity capacity building programming in Eurasia and Latin America.

*Adjunct Professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations*

**August 2010—Present**

- Current courses include Fundamentals of National Security, International Relations, Global Cybersecurity Policy, U.S. Diplomacy Lab, , Topics in Globalization, and Writing for Intelligence.

**United States Southern Command****April 2013—Present***Consultant Support for Socio-Cultural Analysis*

- Provide security expertise to support USSOUTHCOM all-source intelligence analysts.
- Support in developing USSOUTHCOM's approach to tactical, operational, and strategic indications and warnings.
- Represent USSOUTHCOM in the IC-wide socio-cultural analysis community of practice—presentations, working groups, host conferences, etc.

**New America****December 2017—Present***Cybersecurity Fellow*

- Support New America's Cybersecurity Initiative.
- New America is a top 25 think tank based in Washington DC.

**PAST PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE**

---

**Florida International University****Applied Research Center (ARC)****May 2013—November 2015***Director of Operations*

- Provided leadership in development of ARC's strategic planning to include development and monitoring of key objective areas, and analysis of progress.
- Led ARC's social science programs and initiatives; Principal Investigator for ARC's Socio-Cultural and Social Sciences Projects.
- Served as the central point of contact within the ARC for industry and business.
- Assisted in developing programs with the Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, and other federal agencies, as well as business and industry as required for ARC and FIU.
- Provided leadership in the respective area of research specialization and executes work on related grants and contracts as assigned.
- Aided the Executive Director in the planning, development and implementation of proposals and contracts. Coordinates interaction between the Applied Research Center and its technology vendors and serves as a liaison for existing and prospective partners.
- Published and/or presented technical programs within the area of specialization at national or international level to enhance and promote the goals and reputation of the Applied Research Center.

**Florida International University****Applied Research Center (ARC)****November 2003—April 2011***Senior Political & Security Analyst*

- Managed programs, to include personnel and resources in excess of US\$1 million annually.
- From 2009 to 2011 was awarded US\$1,750M to develop the FIU-SOUTHCOM Academic Partnership in support of SOUTHCOM's Socio-Cultural Dynamics program. Oversaw the production of 17 strategic culture studies of countries throughout Latin America and the Caribbean and developed a network consisting of more than 50 academic institutions and over 300 scholars in Latin American and Caribbean discourse.

- From 2007 to 2010 was awarded approximately US\$150K by the United States Army War College to plan and host the 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010 editions of the Western Hemisphere Security conference series, the preeminent Latin America security conference series established in 1997.
- In 2007 and 2008, helped create the Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center (WHEMSAC) in cooperation with United States Southern Command; an academic program dedicated to United States Southern Command's research requirements. Total funding US\$2.6M since 2007.
- From 2003 to 2007, acted as the lead liaison between senior U.S. and Latin America military personnel for the Western Hemisphere Information Exchange Program (WHIX); a program funded by the Assistant Secretary of the Army. During this period, he developed relations with Argentine, Chilean, Dominican, Honduran, Peruvian and Salvadoran military institutions. Total funding approximately US\$12M since 2003.

## EDUCATION

---

- **Ph.D. in Political Science**, Florida International University; Miami, FL. (expected 2022). Currently in year two of the coursework. (Achieved Doctoral Candidacy status in 2021)
- **Master of Arts in International Business**, Florida International University; Miami, FL. 2010.
- **Bachelor of Arts in International Relations**, Florida International University; Miami, FL. 2006.
- **Executive Certificate in Cybersecurity: The Intersection of Policy and Technology**, Harvard Kennedy School, July 2020.
- **Executive Certificate in Cybersecurity Leadership & Strategy**, Florida International University; Miami, FL. 2016.
- **Professional Certificate in Transnational Democracy, Stability, and Security**, National Defense University; Washington, D.C. 2008.
- **Undergraduate Certificate in Asian Studies**, Florida International University; Miami, FL. 2006.
- **Study Abroad**, Sichuan University; Chengdu, Peoples Republic of China, 2001-2002.

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

---

- **Fundamentals of National Security**, Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs: Department of Politics and International Relations, Florida International University; Miami, FL. 2016-Present.
- **Introduction to Latin American Studies**, Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University; Miami, FL. 2013-Present.
- **International Relations of Latin America**, Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs: Department of Politics and International Relations, Florida International University; Miami, FL. 2010-Present.
- **Comparative Politics of Central America**, Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs: Department of Politics and International Relations, Florida International University; Miami, FL. 2010-Present.

- **Global Cyber Policy**, Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs, Florida International University; Miami, FL. 2018-Present.
- **Honors Seminar V: U.S. Department of State's Diplomacy Lab**, Honors College, Florida International University; Miami, FL. 2014-Present.

#### AWARDS/GRANTS/FELLOWSHIPS

- US Department of Commerce's National Institute for Standards and Technologies: Principal Investigator, National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education. 2018 through 2022. \$1,250,000.00.
- US Department of Defense: Principal Investigator, Critical Technologies Studies Program. 2018-2021. \$2,000,000.00.
- USSOUTHCOM: Principal Investigator, FIU-SOUTHCOM Academic-Defense Partnership. 2013-Present. \$1,000,000.00.
- INL: Co-Principal Investigator, Gang Phenomena in El Salvador. March 2016. \$175,000.00.
- USSOUTHCOM: Co-Principal Investigator, FIU-SOUTHCOM Academic-Defense Partnership. 2009-2011. \$2,000,000.00.
- US Army War College: Principal Investigator, Western Hemisphere Security Colloquium. 2007-2009. \$150,000.00.
- United States Marine Corps: U.S. Marine of the Year, 2000.
- United States Navy, Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal. 1998, 2000.
- United States Marine Corps: Marine of the Quarter, 1998.
- United States Marine Corps: Honor Graduate, 1997.

#### PUBLICATIONS

##### **Books**

- Gabriel Marcelo, Orlando Perez and Brian Fonseca (Eds), *Democracy and Security in Latin America* (Routledge, Forthcoming 2021).
- Brian Fonseca and Eduardo Gamarra (Eds), *Culture and National Security in the Americas* (Lexington Books, 2017).
- Brian Fonseca and Jonathan D. Rosen, *The New US Security Agenda: Trends and Emerging Threats* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

##### **Book Chapters**

- Brian Fonseca and Randy Pestana, "A Symptom of Crisis in Honduras: Drug Trafficking," in *Cooperation and Drug Policies in the Americas: Trends in the Twenty-First Century*, by Roberto Zepeda and Jonathan D. Rosen (Eds.) (Lexington: Lexington Books, 2015), 119-134.
- Brian Fonseca and Pamela Pamela, "Organized Chaos: Venezuela's Prison Crisis," in *Prisons in the Americas in the Twenty-First Century*, by Jonathan S. Rosen and Marten W. Brienens (eds.) (Lexington: Lexington Books, 2015), 115-128.



- Brian Fonseca and Fred A. Quintana, “Globalizacao e Contrabando de Seres Humanos no Hemisferio,” in *Seguranca e Governanca nas Americas*, Marcos Aurelio Guendas de Oliveria (ed.) (Olinda: Luciana Bello Guedes, 2009) 235-250.
- Juan M. del Aguila, Frank O. Mora, and Brian Fonseca, “Cuba: Revolution in the Balance,” in *Latin American Politics and Development*, 9<sup>th</sup> edition. Harvey F. Kline, Christine J. Wade and Howard J. Wiarda (eds.) (Westview Press, 2018) 345-368.

### Congressional Testimonies

- Brian Fonseca, “Dollar Diplomacy or Debt Trap? Examining China’s Role in the Western Hemisphere,” Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee | Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade, May 9, 2019.

### Articles

- Fabiana Sofia Perera and Brian Fonseca, “Militaries in Post Authoritarian Regimes” Florida International University, Forthcoming January 2021.
- Brian Fonseca and Jose Miguel Cruz, “A Mutating Virus: How Organized Crime Groups Are Evolving, and What Governments Can Do About It.” Guess Who’s Having a Good Pandemic: How COVID-19 is Changing Organized Crime, *Americas Quarterly*, January 2021.
- Frank Mora and Brian Fonseca, “It’s Not the 1970s Again for Latin America’s Militaries. Here’s Why.” Special Report on Latin America’s 21<sup>st</sup> Century Militaries, *Americas Quarterly*, December 2019. <https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/new-role-latin-americas-militaries>
- Brian Fonseca and John Polga-Hecimovich, “Two Nations, One Revolution: The Evolution of Contemporary Cuba-Venezuela Relations,” *Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars*, December 2019. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/Venezuela-Cuba%20FINAL.pdf>
- Robert Morgus, Brian Fonseca, Kieran Green, Alexander Crowther, “Are China and Russia on the Cyber Offensive in Latin America and the Caribbean?,” *New America*, July 2019, <https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/reports/russia-china-cyber-offensive-latam-caribbean/#authors>.
- Brian Fonseca, David Kramer, and Frank Mora, “Venezuela isn’t Syria: Why the US shouldn’t overreact to Putin’s Bluff,” *CNN*, February 2019, <https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/01/opinions/venezuela-isnt-syria-and-putin-is-bluffing-fonseca-kramer-mora/index.html>.
- Brian Fonseca and Vladimir Rouvinski, “The Russians of Latin America: Moscow’s Bid for Influence Over Russian-Speaking Communities in the Region,” *Military Review: The Professional Journal of the U.S. Army*, November-December 2018,



<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/November-December-2018/Fonseca-Russia-Latam/>.

- Brian Fonseca, “To meet the need for cybersecurity skills, higher educational institutions, industry and government agencies must work together,” *The Miami Herald*, October 2018, <https://www.miamiherald.com/latest-news/article220653140.html>.
- Brian Fonseca and David J. Kramer, “China and Russia: A Strategic Alliance in the Making?” *The American Interest*, September 2018, <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/09/11/a-strategic-alliance-in-the-making/>.
- Brian Fonseca, “Russian Deceptive Propaganda Growing Fast in Latin America,” *Dialogo Digital Military Magazine*, July 2018, <https://dialogo-americas.com/en/articles/russian-deceptive-propaganda-growing-fast-latin-america>.
- Brian Fonseca, “The Perils of a Putsch in Venezuela,” *Foreign Policy Magazine*, May 2018, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/04/the-perils-of-a-putsch-in-venezuela/>.
- Brian Fonseca, Frank Mora and Brian Latell, “Argentine Military Culture,” *Florida International University*, , April 2016, <https://gordoninstitute.fiu.edu/policy-innovation/military-culture-series/frank-mora-brian-fonseca-and-pablo-atencio-2017-argentine-military-culture.pdf>.
- Brian Fonseca, John Polga-Hemocivich and Harold Trinkunas, “Venezuelan Military Culture,” *Florida International University*, May 2016, <https://gordoninstitute.fiu.edu/policy-innovation/military-culture-series/brian-fonseca-john-polga-hecimovich-and-harold-trinkunas-2016-venezuelan-military-culture.pdf>.
- Brian Fonseca, José Miguel Cruz, Eduardo Gamarra, Jonathan D. Rosen, Daniela Campos and Randy Pestana, “An Analysis of Colombian Perceptions: Internal and External Actors and the Pursuit of Peace,” *Florida International University*, April 2016, <https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BwmN-IVj82wiUG5XSVI5QXF0TUVXbnlsVENpd1EybfFc3dEhn/view>.
- Frank Mora, Brian Fonseca, and Brian Latell, “Cuban Military Culture,” *Florida International University*, April 2016, <https://gordoninstitute.fiu.edu/policy-innovation/military-culture-series/frank-mora-brian-fonseca-and-brian-latell-2016-cuban-military-culture.pdf>.
- Brian Fonseca, “In Mexico It’s Institutions, Stupid,” *Huffington Post*, March 2016, [https://www.huffpost.com/entry/in-mexico-its-institution\\_b\\_9523684](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/in-mexico-its-institution_b_9523684).
- Brian Fonseca, “The key to combating cyber insecurity: changing behavior, training the workforce,” *The Miami Herald*, November 2016, <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/biz-monday/article114587488.html>.
- Dan Restrepo, Frank Mora, Brian Fonseca, and Jonathan D. Rosen, “The United States and Colombia: From Security Partners to Global Partners in Peace,” *Center for American*

*Progress*, February 2016,

<https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2016/02/02/130251/the-united-states-and-colombia-from-security-partners-to-global-partners-in-peace/>.

- Brian Fonseca and G. Alexander Crowther, "Toward a modern security policy in the Western Hemisphere," *Global Americans Smart News & Research for Latin America's Changemakers*, February 2016, <https://theglobalamericans.org/2016/02/toward-a-modern-security-policy-in-the-western-hemisphere/>.
- Brian Fonseca, "Reversing Colombia's Security Deficit: Plan Colombia," *Huffington Post*, November 2015, [https://www.huffpost.com/entry/reversing-colombias-security\\_b\\_8614106?guccounter=1&guce\\_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xILmNvbS8&guce\\_referrer\\_sig=AQAAAHnvlAbMqNC9jnb-6f4XclEyYTo5S9S\\_ylpGJ8Oy3jW\\_FQ2CTPaEsr70KVKx9yAikLKyWZ8SwDOoLju1FFLXYUyBk-S3jrVqhrVIOvNvPZ0JnwpHiZZbWtxSY1rnc8jPyHilcasejbb6zZQrT0fS36sUtef2i93m-uffFWORUEWMf](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/reversing-colombias-security_b_8614106?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xILmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAHnvlAbMqNC9jnb-6f4XclEyYTo5S9S_ylpGJ8Oy3jW_FQ2CTPaEsr70KVKx9yAikLKyWZ8SwDOoLju1FFLXYUyBk-S3jrVqhrVIOvNvPZ0JnwpHiZZbWtxSY1rnc8jPyHilcasejbb6zZQrT0fS36sUtef2i93m-uffFWORUEWMf).
- Frank Mora and Brian Fonseca, "United States Policy Towards in the Hemisphere: Influencing the State and Beyond," *PRISM*, November 2015, [https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism\\_5-4/United%20States%20Policy%20in%20Hemisphere.pdf](https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_5-4/United%20States%20Policy%20in%20Hemisphere.pdf).
- Frank Mora and Brian Fonseca, "Introduction: Links between Terrorist and Criminal Organizations," *DIALOGO*, September 2015.
- Frank Mora and Brian Fonseca, "Latin America's High-Tech Warriors," *Americas Quarterly*, April 2015, <https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/latin-americas-high-tech-warriors>.
- Joseph S. Tulchin and Brian Fonseca, "Peruvian Strategic Culture," *Florida International University*, August 2010, <https://www.scribd.com/document/204270743/Peruvian-Strategic-Culture-Joseph-Tulchin-and-Brian-Fonseca>.
- Brian Fonseca, "Domestic Politics in the Dominican Republic after the Earthquake in Haiti," *Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center*, June 2010, <https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/whemsac/52/>.
- Eduardo Gamarra and Brian Fonseca, "Haitian Strategic Culture," *Florida International University*, September 2009, <http://library.avemaria.edu/title/haitian-strategic-culture/oclc/773510535>.
- Brian Fonseca, "Human Smuggling and the Terrorist-Criminal Nexus," *Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center*, January 2009 (Research paper No. 15).
- Brian Fonseca, "Identifying Opportunities for US-Cuba Military Cooperation," *Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center*, December 2008 (Research Paper No. 13).
- Brian Fonseca and Evan Ellis, "Emerging Relationships: China and Latin America," *Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center*, May 2008 (Research Paper No. 6).



- Brian Fonseca, "Emerging Relationships: Iran & Latin America," *Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center*, February 2008.
- Brian Fonseca, "Energy Outlook: Brazil," *Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center*, January 2008 (Research Paper No. 16).

#### SELECT PRESENTATIONS

---

- **Speaker**, "The Changing Role of The F.A. And Its Possibilities to Mitigate and Address New Threats," InterAmerican Defense Board, April 28, 2021, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KNFr6u6jhRM> (talk begins at 4:42)
- **Panelist**, 3<sup>rd</sup> Annual Security Conference on Latin America and the Caribbean, Johns Hopkins University, February 25, 2021.
- **Panelist**, China-Latin America, Johns Hopkins University, November 2020.
- **Panelist**, Department of Defense Roundtable, "Americas Quarterly Launch: Back in the Spotlight: A Special Report on Latin America's 21<sup>st</sup> Century Military," Miami, Florida: February 12, 2020.
- **Panelist**, "Venezuela Crisis," FIU's State of the World 2020, Miami, Florida: January 10, 2020
- **Panelist**, "Russian Media in Latin America and the Caribbean," International Studies Association South, Memphis, Tennessee: October 5, 2019.
- **Panelist**, Discussion on national security, featuring Army Brigadier General Timothy D. Brown, Director of Intelligence, US Southern Command, "The US Intelligence Community After 9/11," Miami, FL: September 11, 2019.
- **Speaker**, Defense Intelligence Agency Roundtable, "Russia in Latin America," Washington, DC: July 2019.
- **Speaker**, "Chinese Engagement in Latin America," Department of State, Washington, DC: June 2019.
- **Speaker**, "The Venezuelan Military Culture," U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC: March 2019
- **Panelist**, Russian Diaspora in the Americas," International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada: March 2019.
- **Speaker**, "Cybersecurity and Water Infrastructure," UNESCO, Florida International University:
- **Speaker**, Global Connections, WorldCity Event, "Cybersecurity: Understanding the Threats," Miami, FL: July 28, 2017.
- **Speaker**, Defense Intelligence Agency Roundtable, "Russia in Latin America," Washington, DC: July 27, 2017.
- **Speaker**, Congressional Hispanic Leadership Initiative, "International Careers Panel," Washington, DC: July 20, 2017.

- **Speaker**, Latin American Studies Association, Annual Congress, LASA at 50, “Security and Defense Policy,” Lima, Peru: May 1, 2017.
- **Moderator**, Moderated discussion with former DEA Agent Steve Murphy, “Narcos: The Real Story Behind Taking Down Pablo Escobar,” Miami, FL: April 2017.
- **Facilitator**, Executive Certificate in Cybersecurity Leadership and Strategy, a 2-Day cyber policy program, Washington, DC: April 6-7, 2017.
- **Moderator**, United States Southern Command, “External State Actor Influence in the Western Hemisphere,” Miami, FL: April 5-6, 2017.
- **Moderator /Discussant**, Russian Cyber Warfare,
- **Moderator/Discussant**, Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce, “Doing Business in Cuba,” Miami, FL: March 7, 2017.
- **Speaker**, Monday Group, CEOs working group in South Florida, Miami, FL
- **Moderator/Discussant**, United States Southern Command, “US Influence in the Western Hemisphere,” Miami, FL: December , 2017.
- **Facilitator**, Executive Certificate in Cybersecurity Leadership and Strategy, a 2-Day cyber policy program, Miami, FL: October 11-12, 2016.
- **Speaker**, Oversees Security Advisory Council, Latin American Regional Council, US Department of State, “Future Scenarios in Venezuela,” Miami, FL: September, 2017.
- **Moderator**, United States Southern Command, “Future Scenarios in Venezuela,” Miami, FL: August 15, 2016.
- **Speaker**, United States Southern Command, “Venezuelan Military Cultures,” Miami, FL: June 2016.
- **Speaker**, Americas Council, “Venezuelan Military Cultures,” Washington, DC: June 2016.
- **Chair**, Latin American Studies Association, Annual Congress. LASA at 50, “Citizen (In) Security and Drug Policy.” New York Hilton Midtown; New York City, NY: May 27-30, 2016.
- **Chair/Presenter**, Latin American Studies Association, Annual Congress. LASA at 50. “Culture and National Security in the Americas.” New York Hilton Midtown; New York City, NY: May 27-30, 2016.
- **Presenter**, Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs. Geopolitical Summit, “The Dark Side of the Web: Challenges to security prosperity and privacy. Cyberterrorism and National Security,” Miami, FL: March 8, 2016.
- **Moderator**, Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy’s 2016 Hemispheric Security Conference: Emerging Threats, “*US Security Policy in the Western Hemisphere*” Frost Art Museum, Miami, FL: March 30, 2016.
- **Presenter**, Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy’s 2016 Hemispheric Security Conference: Emerging Threats, “*Energy Security, Climate Change and Illegal mining in Peru*” Frost Art Museum, Miami, FL: March 30, 2016.

- **Presenter**, St. Thomas, Intercultural Human Rights Law Review, 11<sup>th</sup> Annual Symposium, The Power of Voice: Rewriting Policy and Implementing Changes Through Protest Movements, “*Militarization of Policing in Central America*,” Miami, FL: November 13, 2015.
- **Presenter**, After the Fall: Energy Security, Sustainable Development and the Environment, “*Challenges for Exporters and Opportunities for Importers in Latin America Presenter*,” University of Miami, Miami, FL: October 19-20, 2015.
- **Presenter**, Mexican International Studies Association (*Asociacion Mexicana de Estudios Internacionales*) Annual Congress, “*US Security Policy in the Western Hemisphere*,” Cancun, Mexico: October 15-17, 2015.
- **Discussant**, Tri-University Research Conference, “Latin America in the 21st Century,” Miami, FL: March 2015.
- **Keynote Speaker**, 1<sup>st</sup> Annual Caribbean Technology Regional Summit, “Liquid Caribbean: Where Miami and the Caribbean Become Cross Regional Partners,” Miami, FL: March 2015.
- **Presenter**, Hemispheric Security and Defense Studies, “Bringing the State Back into the Analysis on Crime and Violence in Latin America,” Catholic University and TADEO, Buenos Aires, Argentina: December 2014.
- **Discussant**, Americas Barometer Release, “US Military Influence in Latin America and the Caribbean,” Miami, FL: April 2014.
- **Presenter**, TECHO Poverty Conference, “Poverty in Latin America,” Miami, FL: March 2014.
- **Presenter**, Intelligence Directorate Indications and Warning Roundtable, “Socio Conflict and Social Media Analysis in I&W,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC: February 2013.
- **Presenter**, World Wide Human Geography Conference, “Socio-Cultural Analysis in Latin America and the Caribbean,” National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC: June 2012.
- **Presenter**, 8th Annual Cuba and Cuban American Studies Conference, “Understanding Opportunities for US-Cuba Military Relations,” Miami, FL: January 2010.
- **Presenter**, US Army Directed Studies Office, “Iran-Venezuela Relations,” Washington DC: June 2008.
- **Presenter**, “Iranian Penetration of Latin America,” Hudson Institute, Washington DC: June 2008.

## MEDIA

---

- Analysis on Cuba and Venezuela featured on ABC, BBC, CBS, CNN, FOX, NBC, and various other national and international media outlets. Provided live TV and radio.
- Serve as the Political Analyst for local Channel 7 News; covered the 2016 national primary and general elections, 2018 midterm elections and the 2020 national primary elections.

## LANGUAGES

---

- English (Native)
- Spanish (Intermediate)

- Mandarin (Conversational)

#### PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

---

- American Political Science Association (APSA), 2014-Present
- International Studies Association (ISA) 2018-Present
- Latin American Studies Association (LASA), 2013-Present
- National Society of Collegiate Scholars

#### MILITARY

---

- United States Marine Corps Reserves, Sergeant, Forward Observer, 1997-2005. Deployments include:
  - Trained personnel from Canada, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Norway and Poland in Fire Support coordination techniques and NATO standards. Conducted Joint Task Force Operations with DEA and Caribbean Police Forces.
  - Participated in military operations and exercises in more than 13 countries and led teams in hostile theaters such as Kosovo, Northern Africa and the Middle East.

#### INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVER DELEGATIONS, CONSULTING, ASSIGNMENTS AND RELATED EXPERIENCES

---

- Organized and Led Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce Trade Mission to China: Beijing, Guangzhou, Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Tianjin, May 2017.
- Election Observer in Guyana, Carter Center (Part of former US President Jimmy Carter's Delegation), May 2015.
- Advisory Board Member, Jack Gordon Institute for National Security Studies, 2014-2015.
- Consultant to Defense Intelligence Agency, 2013-Present.
- Annual US-Turkey Faculty Exchange Program funded by the Istanbul Center in the United States, 2010.
- Served as the Chairperson of the Americas Linkage Committee at the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce from June 2016—June 2018